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CHANGE OF STATUS OF A PARTY TO A COLLECTIVE
LABOR AGREEMENT
THE relationship created by a collective agreement is frequently disturbed
by changes in parties. Changes in the employer typically result from such
transactions as the sale or lease of a plant,1 sale of all the assets of a company,2
and merger or consolidation. 3 Changes in the union frequently stem from
gradual shifts of membership due to individual resignations, 4 transfers to rival
groups,5 and expulsions. But mass switches also contribute to union changes.
Thus, the employees may formally dissolve their local or disaffiliate it from
the national. Either occurrence is usually a step in the process of mass affilia-
tion with another national.6 Other changes in the union may arise from revoca-
tion of the local's charter by the national7 or a schism in the local or the
1. See, e.g., Application of Swift & Co., 76 N.Y.S.2d 881 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (purchase
of plant; vendee refused to assume predecessor's obligations and therefore not compelled
to arbitrate severance pay dispute).
2. See, e.g., Empire Case Goods Workers Union v. Empire Case Goods Co., 271
App. Div. 149, 63 N.Y.S.2d 35 (4th Dep't 1946).
3. See, e.g., Commercial Telegraphers' Union v. Western Union Tel. Co., 53 F. Supp.
90 (D.D.C. 1943).
Other types of employer changes may include reorganization of a corporation or
a partnership, death of an individual proprietor, and receivership and bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. For lists of cases dealing with the effects of these changes on contracts in
general, see Notes, 149 A.L.R. 787 (1944) ; 59 A.L.R. 294 (1929).
4. A representative may lose its bargaining position if it loses the allegiance of the
majority of the members of the bargaining unit. See the decertification procedure pro-
vided in the amended NLRA § 9(c), 61 STAT. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (Supp.
1950). For an example, see Walker County Hosiery Mills, 91 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (1950).
5. Frequently, workers join a new union while they still maintain membership in the
contracting organization. See, e.g., In re Grant Bldg., Inc., 45 Pa. D. & C. 442 (C.P.
1942). This is especially true when a union security contract is in effect. See, e.g.,
Triboro Coach Co. v. NYSLRB, 286 N.Y. 314, 36 N.E.2d 315 (1941).. Labor
organizations often expel members who are guilty of dual unionism. See, e.g., Federal
Electric Products Co., 1 LAB. Aat. REP. 13, 17 LAB. REL. R EP. (Ref. Man.) 2685 (1945).
6. See, e.g., Black-Clawson Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 773 (1945) (formal dissolution) ; Liquid
Carbonic Corp., 85 N.L.R.B. 284 (1949) (disaffiliation). Occasionally, following formal
dissolution, the employees may choose to remain without a bargaining agent. Or they
may later form one or more new locals with varying national affiliations. But a local
which enjoys majority status is not likely to dissolve unless the members wish to
shift en masse to a rival, or to form an independent. If the workers lose interest in
unionization, the local is more likely to dwindle in membership. Eventually, it will
be dissolved when only a handful of members are left or it will become defunct without
formal action. See, e.g., Container Corp. of America, 61 N.L.R.B. 823 (1945). Of course,
company-dominated organizations with majority membership may be disbanded by
formal collective action as a result of unfair labor practice proceedings against the
employer. See, e.g., Wyman-Gordon Co. v. NLRB, 153 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1946).
7. See, e.g., in re Klinger, 259 App. Div. 309, 19 N.Y.S. 2d 193 (1st Dep't 1940).
national.8 Many of these shifts may be precipitated when a national union
secedes or is expelled from a federation and continues as a going organization.9
When a change occurs in either of the parties to a valid collective agree-
ment, several important problems arise as to the rights and duties of the con-
tinuing and altered parties subsequent to the change.' 0 After a change in
union, under what circumstances may the original contracting local retain
recognition as the exclusive bargaining agent? After a change in employer or
union, may the continuing party require the new party to assume the con-
tract? And may the new party enforce the agreement against the continuing
party?
The existing handful of judicial decisions indicates that a slight pattern
may be emerging. Traditional doctrines of sanctity, privity, and freedom of
contract generally prevail even though the results of their application may be
inconsistent with the basic objectives of the national and state labor relations
laws-freedom of association, collective bargaining, and avoidance of inter-
ruptions in commerce resulting from interference with these rights." The
policy of the labor acts may be most seriously affected where the employer or
the abandoned union has attempted to prevent the new or dissident organiza-
tion from acting as bargaining agent.
In New York, courts will enforce contracts between an employer and a suc-
cessor union when the union "by process of evolution or reorganization [has]
inherited the powers, assets and membership" of its contracting predecessor.'
2
The "inheritance" requirement is satisfied when the successor union is the
result of an amalgamation, 13 or when a union merely changes its name and
affiliation.' 4 But the claim of a union that it represents a majority of the old
8. See, e.g., Foley Lumber & Export Corp., 70 N.L.R.B. 73 (1946) (local).
9. For example, the expulsion from the CIO of the United Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers of America (UE) on November 2, 1949, was immediately followed
by the formation of the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers
(IUtE-CIO). A large percentage of UIE's membership shifted to IUE through formal
dissolutions of locals, schisms in locals and individual shifts. A deluge of court actions
and board proceedings has followed. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Kriss, 25 LAB. REL. REP.
(Ref. Man.) 2337 (N.D.N.Y. 1950) (creation of competing local); Fitzgerald v.
Eisner, 25 LAB. Ra. REP. (Ref. Man.) 2140 (S.D. Ohio 1949) (formal dissolution);
Telex Inc., 90 N.L.R.B. No. 43 (1950) (individual withdrawals); Hoover Co., 90
N.L.R.B. No. 265 (1950) (decertification proceedings).
10. For general discussions of the problem, see Comment, 51 YALE L.J. 465 (1942);
Note, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1413, 1423-6 (1950).
11. See declaration of policy, amended NLRA § 1, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§151 (Supp. 1950).
12. In re Klinger, 259 App. Div. 309, 310, 19 N.Y.S.2d 193, 194 (1st Dep't 1940).
13. Monyoky v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 112 N.Y.L.J. 1563, 15 LAB.
REI. RPP. (Ref. Man.) 683 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944); Anderson v. Universal Brass
Turning Co., 10 LAB. REL. RaE,. (Ref. Man.) 902 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1942).
14. World Trading Corp. v. Kolchin, 166 Misc. 854, 855, 2 N.Y.S.2d 195 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1938) (union's "identity, structure, operation, constitution, by-laws, officers
and membership are still the same.. . ."). Cf. NLRB v. Harris-Woodson Co., 179 F.2d
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union's members is not sufficient in itself to show the necessary privity.15 And
this is also true where the union claims to have been established by a national
organization to replace a local whose charter was revoked.16
Elsewhere, courts have stressed the affiliation between the local and parent
and the relation of both to the employer. Thus, suspension of a local's charter
by a national union does not permit the employer to disregard his contract
with the local where the national is neither a party to the contract nor men-
tioned in it.17 But where the agreement specifically mentions the national
affiliation of the contracting local or includes the national as a signatory party,
the seceding group is not permitted to act as a contracting party.'8 And the
720 (4th Cir. 1950) (employer not relieved of duty to bargain with majority repre-
sentative when latter changes its name and affiliation).
15. Morrison v. Majestic Laundry System, Inc., 103 N.Y.S.2d 791 (Sup. Ct. 1951)
(local formed by seceding majority denied decree substituting it for contracting local
as administrator of collective agreement); Weiss v. Fields Shops, Inc., 8 LAE. REL.
REP. (Ref. Man.) 1064 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
16. It re Klinger, 259 App. Div. 309, 19 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1st Dep't 1940). Although
it is still unclear whether a new union will be bound by the contract of its predecessor,
New York courts might apply the inheritance principle in this area also.
At first, the National Labor Relations Board required a newly certified union to take
over an existing contract. New England Transportation Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 130 (1936).
More recently, the Board has declined to decide the fate of the old agreement, leaving
it to negotiation between the parties, or to the courts. See, e.g., Boston Machine
Works Co., 89 N.L.R.B. No. 17 (1950) (all prior opinions to the contrary expressly
overruled).
A proposed section of the House Bill to revise the NLRA provided that a newly
certified representative must assume the contract of the old bargaining agent for the
remainder of the contract term. This provision was rejected in committee. H.R. REP.
No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1947).
17. Montaldo v. Hires Bottling Co., 59 Cal. App. 2d 642, 139 P.2d 666 (3rd Dist. 1943)
(court rejected employer's contention that suspension constituted failure of consideration).
Cf. Louisville Ry. Co. v. Louisville Area Transport Workers Union, 312 Ky. 657, 228
S.W.2d 652 (1950) (national union not a party to contract could not block local's
assignment of its contract to independent union which majority of local's members
had joined).
18. M & M Woodworking Co. v. Plywood & Veneer Workers Local Union No. 102,
23 F. Supp. 11 (D. Ore. 1938); M & M Woodworking Co. v. NLRB, 101 F.2d 938
(9th Cir. 1939), setting aside 6 N.L.R.B. 372 (1938) ; Mason Mfg. Co. v. United Furniture
Workers of America, Local No. 576, 2 LAB. REnL. REP. (Ref. Man.) 839 (Calif. Super.
Ct. 1938). See also Suffridge v. O'Grady, 84 N.Y.S.2d 211 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (deserted
national allowed to administer welfare fund established by contract).
The court of appeals implied in the second 1 & M case that the new majority might
have been recognized as contracting party if the local's disaffiliation had been accomplished
in strict compliance with the union constitution. 101 F.2d 938, 941 (9th Cir. 1939). This,
however, will be of little value to future secessionists. Disaffiliation clauses in union con-
stitutions are generally so drafted that it is almost impossible for a local to withdraw
as a unit in accordance with their terms. Typically, the clause permits a very small
number of members, loyal to the parent, to retain the local's charter in the face of
an overwhelming majority vote for disaffiliation or dissolution. See, e.g., General Laws,
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employer can invoke the union security provisions to throw the seceding
workers out of their jobs.19 The courts regard retention of the stipulated
affiliation as a condition of continued employment. And it makes no difference
that all of the signatory company's employees have switched to the rival organ-
ization. The contracts were made for the benefit of all the members of the
national union, not merely for those employed by the signatory companies.
Therefore, if a worker leaves the organization contrary to the agreement,
other members of the national have a right to his job.20
Some courts have gone so far as to uphold enforcement of a closed shop con-
tract with the signatory union even after a rival union was certified as ex-
clusive bargaining agent by the state labor relations board.2 1 These decisions
were based on the feeling that employees should not be allowed to repudiate
their obligations by replacing their representatives during the life of a valid
agreement.2
2
§ 25, of United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, quoted at 101 F.2d 938, 941
(9th Cir. 1939) (ten members clause).
In addition, many national constitutions place onerous penalties on withdrawal. Thus,
they may provide that if a local secedes, its monies and property are to be delivered to
the parent body upon demand. See, e.g., United Public Workers of America v. Local
312, 94 F. Supp. 538 (E.D. Mich. 1950). The courts will generally enforce these
constitutions as valid contracts between the organizations and the members. Schnitzler
v. Scida, 27 LAB. REL. REP. (Ref. Man.) 2025 (E.D.N.Y. 1950). Contra: Harker v.
McKissock, 10 N.J. Sup. Ct. 26, 76 A.2d 89 (1950). But several courts have recently
refused to enforce similar provisions of the UE constitution. The rationale advanced
was that the effectiveness of these constitutional provisions is subject to an implied
condition of continued affiliation with the CIO. And since UE has been expelled from
the CIO they are no longer enforceable against the local unions. Local 1140 of UE v.
UE, 45 N.W.2d 408 (Minn. 1950).
19. See cases cited in first paragraph of note 18 supra. But compare Mason Mfg. Co.
v. United Furniture Workers of America, Local No. 576, 2 LAB. REM. REP. (Ref. Man.)
839 (Calif. Super. Ct. 1938), with Mason Mfg. Co., 15 N.L.R.B. 295 (1939), modified
and enforcement granted, 126 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1942) (state court approved employer's
enforcement of closed shop contract upon disaffiliation. But the employer's action was
held to be an unfair labor practice by NLRB and federal Court of Appeals). These
cases, and the M & M cases cited in the first paragraph of note 18 supra, illustrate an
early conflict between courts and boards. The boards were primarily concerned with
the uncoerced selection of employee representatives. The courts, of course, generally
had the final word.
20. Mason Mfg. Co. v. United Furniture Workers of America, Local No. 576, 2
LAB. RET. REP. (Ref. Man.) 839 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1938); cf. Pennsylvania LRB v.
Red Star Shoe Repairing Co., 2 LAB. REL. REP. (Ref. Man.) 882 (Pa. C.P. 1938).
21. Triboro Coach Corp. v. NYSLRB, 286 N.Y. 314, 36 N.E.2d 315 (1941); and
see Labarge v. Malone Aluminum Corp., 6 LAB. REm. REP. (Ref. Man.) 1073 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1940) (certification by NLRB).
22. Triboro Coach Corp. v. NYSLRB, 286 N.Y. 314, 322, 36 N.E. 2d 315, 318 (1941).
To the same effect, see cases cited in first paragraph of note 18 supra.
During the life of the old agreement, the courts permit the certified union to negotiate
a new agreement to take effect at the expiration of the old one. See Triboro Coach
Corp. v. NYSLRB, supra; Johnson v. Bee Lines, Inc., 262 App. Div. 762, 27 N.Y.S.2d
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At first blush, protecting the existing contract under the administration of
the signatory union may seem to promote industrial stability. Actually, it is
also likely to cause strife. If courts refuse to give effect to the new choice of
the majority of the employees, a strike for recognition may follow.23 And even
if the new majority group does not stop work, the repudiated union is unlikely
to achieve much success in administering the contract and processing griev-
ances. Employee resentment and unrest are likely to mount, with an ac-
companying decrease in productivity.
Moreover, an employer may be caught in a crossfire of conflicting directives.
This clash can arise not only between courts and state labor boards, but also
between courts and the NLRB. For the NLRB places greater stress on the
statutory right of free choice of bargaining agent than on traditional contract
doctrines. Thus, the Board has directed an election and certified a new union
in the face of a court order enforcing the old union's contract.24 And it has
found an unfair labor practice when an employer refused to bargain with a
certified union because a state court order restrained the employer from
breaching his contract with a rival organization.
25
732, 733 (2d Dep't 1941), reversing 8 LAB. REL. Rm. (Ref. Man.) 1081 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1941).
23. The likelihood and legality of a strike for recognition following the decision
was noted by both the majority and the dissenters in Triboro Coach Corp. v. NYSLRB,
286 N.Y. 314, 322, 338-9, 349, 36 N.E.2d 315, 318, 325-6, 330 (1941). And the strike
did in fact take place. New York Times, Aug. 9, 1941, p. 17, col. 1.
A strike for recognition by an uncertified union is legal under the amended NLRA
unless (1) the strike is against an employer other than the one from which recognition
is sought, or (2) another union is already certified. § 8(b), 61 STAT. 141 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (B) and (C) (Supp. 1950).
24. Presto Recording Corp., 34 N.L.R.B. 28, 36 N.L.R.B. 281 (1941) (directing
election and certifying winner in face of court order enforcing contract of rival union) ;
Pacific Box Co., 50 N.L.R.B. 720 (same); Air Conditioning Co. of Southern California,
81 N.L.R.B. 946 (1949) (in processing representation petition, Board refused to await
outcome of pending suit); Libby, McNeill & Libby, 64 N.L.R.B. 30 (1945) (same).
The Board feels that its duty to determine bargaining agents cannot be affected by a
contract action in a state court. Air Conditioning Co. of Southern California, supra
at 949.
25. The Grace Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 435 (1949). Where the identity of the majority
union was in dispute, the Board has ordered an employer to disavow a contract in
spite of a court decree of specific enforcement. National Electric Products Corp.,
3 N.L.R.B. 475, 500-3 (1937) (decree of U.S. District Court for W.D. Pa. entered
July 29, 1937). And' in Mason Mfg. Co., 15 N.L.R.B. 295 (1939), modified and en-
forcement granted, 126 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1942), the Board, in an unfair labor practice
proceeding, declared invalid a contract that was ruled valid by a state court. Accord:
Williams Mfg. Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 135 (1938); cf. NYSLRB v. Holland Laundry, Inc.,
294 N.Y. 480, 63 N.E.2d 68 (1945) (previous court finding in injunction proceeding
that contract was valid not res judicata in subsequent New York labor board unfair
labor practice proceeding). But where a contract was already in effect, one state
court has enjoined enforcement of another agreement even though it was negotiated
with a union certified by the N.L.R.B. Labarge v. Malone Aluminum Corp., 6 LAB.
Rui. REP. (Ref. Man.) 1073 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940).
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Where the question is one of a replacing employer's rights and duties under
an existing agreement, a distinction may be drawn between a merger or con-
solidation and an ordinary sale. Upon a merger or consolidation, the collec-
tive agreement of each firm probably will continue to be binding on both the
resulting corporation and the signatory unions.26 The contract signed by the
surviving company before a merger will not be imposed upon the employees of
the absorbed corporationY.2  Similarly, when a corporation buys out another
company other than by merger or consolidation, the transferee's employees
will not be compelled to abandon their old union and join the organization with
which their new employer has signed a union security contract.28 But, con-
trary to the merger-consolidation situation, it is not likely that their new em-
ployer would be able to hold the incoming employees to a contract they had
signed with their predecessor employer. And some courts have held that un-
less a successor employer voluntarily assumes his predecessor's labor agree-
ment, he will not be required to honor it.29 This may be true even where
management of the business remains substantially the same, 0 and where the
sale is admittedly an attempt to get out from under a labor agreement.31
26. There is no clear authority for this statement, but see Commercial Telegraphers'
Union v. Western Union Tel. Co., 53 F. Supp. 90 (D.D.C. 1943) (federal statute).
By statute in all states, the surviving or resulting corporation assumes the debts and
liabilities of the merged or consolidated corporations. BALLANTINE, CORPORLTIONS
§§ 289, 294 (Rev. ed. 1946); Note, 149 A.L.R. 787, 801 (1944). Generally, executory
contracts pass to the new company. Ducasse v. American Yellow Taxd Operators, Inc.,
224 App. Div. 516, 231 N.Y. Supp. 511 (2d Dep't 1928).
Language in the Commercial Telegraphers" case suggests that the union continues to
be bound by its contract in merger and consolidation cases. 53 F. Supp. 90, 96-7
(D.D.C. 1943).
27. Commercial Telegraphers' Union v. Western Union Tel. Co., 53 F. Supp. 90
(D.D.C. 1943).
28. NYSLRB v. Club Transportation Corp., 275 App. Div. 536, 90 N.Y.S.2d 367
(2d Dep't 1949).
29. Empire Case Goods Workers Union v. Empire Case Goods Co., 271 App. Div.
149, 63 N.Y.S.2d 35 (4th Dep't 1946); Application of Swift & Co., 76 N.Y.S.2d 881
(Sup. Ct. 1947); accord Herman Loewenstein, Inc., 75 N.L.R.B. 377 (1947); Douglas
Aircraft Co., 27 WAR LABn. REP. 7 (1945).
30. Good Foods, Inc. v. Loupos, 5 LAB. REL. REP. (Ref. Man.) 936 (N.J.Ch. 1939)
(newly formed corporation purchased business from insolvent firm; predecessor's man-
ager, who signed contract with union, continued to act as manager).
31. Berry v. Old South Engraving Co., 283 Mass. 441, 186 N.E. 601 (1933) (busi-
ness sold to new corporation organized by officers and stockholders of selling corpo-
ration).
A New York court reached an opposite result when a partnership tried to avoid
a collective agreement by forming a corporation. Goldman v. Rosenzweig, 10 LAW
& LABoR 207 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1928) (court enjoined old employers from repudiating
contract and enjoined new employer from directing or counseling violation of contract,
without deciding whether new employer was bound by it).
An employer cannot avoid its duty to bargain with a majority union, or to remedy
unfair labor practices by transferring the business to a new firm which is the "alter ego"
of the old one. NLRB v. O'Keefe & Merritt Mfg. Co., 178 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1949) ;
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Proposed Solution
Whenever doubt arises as to whether a change has occurred in either of the
parties to a collective agreement, two basic questions must be answered: with
whom should the other party deal; and, if one of the original parties has been
replaced, should the old contract continue in effect. Courts should tackle the
first question by refusing to enforce a collective agreement by or against a
union which is not entitled to act as bargaining agent of the employees con-
cerned.32 Whenever a court is faced with a dispute over which union, if any,
is entitled to act as bargaining agent, the court should direct the parties to
petition the National Labor Relations Board for a determination of representa-
tives.13 Whether the Board directs an election or dismisses the petition, its
action will normally decide which organization is the exclusive representa-
tive.34 Pending the outcome of the representation proceeding, the agreement
Autopart Mfg. Co., 91 N.L.R.B. No. 11 (1950). And a certification may be amended
to apply to a new employer which purchased the assets of the original company and
continues to operate the plant in the same manner and with the same employees. Miller
Lumber Co., 90 N.L.R.B. No. 185 (1950).
An employer's liability on a contract will ordinarily terminate with its ownership.
Amelotte v. Jacob Dold Packing Co., 173 Misc. 477; 17 N.Y.S.2d 929 (Sup. Ct. 1940),
aff'd 260 App. Div. 984, 24 N.Y.S.2d 134 (4th Dep't 1940). But where the employees
are deprived of the benefit of their bargain by the contracting employer's fraud or
misrepresentation, the latter may be held liable. Thus when a partnership was incorpo-
rated in an attempt to avoid a labor agreement, the partners were ordered to abide by
the contract's terms. Goldman v. Rosenzweig, supra. And an employer which con-
cealed the fact that it had sold its business until after contract benefits on which the
employees relied had become due was required to pay the benefits. Empire Case Goods
Workers Union v. Empire Case Goods Co., 271 App. Div. 149, 63 N.Y.S.2d 35 (4th
Dep't 1946) (paid vacations). An employer which failed to bind its vendee to a
labor contract as required by the terms of the instrument, was ordered to arbitrate,
under that contract, the question of whether it must pay damages to employees dis-
charged by the successor. Application of Swift & Co., 76 N.Y.S.2d 881 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1947).
32. For cases on specific enforcement of collective agreements, see Note, 156, A.L.R.
652 (1945).
When the action is for damages for a past breach, the criterion should be whether
the union was entitled to act as representative at the time of the alleged breach.
It should' make no difference whether it is presently entitled to act.
33. For the statutory provisions on the determination of representatives, see amended
NLRA § 9(c), 61 STAT. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (Supp. 1950). Of course, the
partivs could on their own initiative petition the NLRB to settle disputes over the
proper bargaining representative before they ask the courts for specific performance.
34. Even the dismissal of a petition by the Board will often determine who is the
exclusive representative. For example, where the Board, after certifying one union
as the exclusive representative, refuses to hold another election until the termination
of the contract entered into by that union, see note 38 infra, the Board's action is
equivalent to a determination that the original union is to remain as exclusive repre-
sentative for the contract period. In other situations where the Board dismisses a
petition, however, its action will not determine who is the proper bargaining agent
and the court will have to settle that question for itself. For example, the Board will
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should be administered by the contracting union.35 However, if there is doubt
as to which union is the contracting union, the court should designate one or
both of the unions to administer the agreement. The court might also wish to
impound the funds and other assets of the contracting union pending the
NLRB decision, in order to prevent their being misused in the interim.3
In deciding whether to conduct an election, the Board is governed by its
contract bar doctrine.3 7 Under that doctrine the Board usually will not disturb
a collective agreement of reasonable duration.3 3 It will refuse to entertain
representation petitions in the bargaining unit covered until shortly before the
contract termination date. During the contract period a new union will not be
certified, even if the contracting union has lost its majority status.30 A deter-
mination of representatives will be directed in spite of an existing contract,
not hold a representation election if all the competing unions have failed to comply with
the filing and affidavit requirements of amended NLRA §§ 9(f), (g), and (h), 61 STAT.
145-6 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(f), (g), and (h) (Supp. 1950), for non-complying
unions are barred from the ballot in such elections. Herman Loewenstein, Inc., 75
N.L.R.B. 377 (1947). But cf. Harris Foundry & Machine Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 118 (1948)
(non-compliance did not keep union off ballot in decertification election). Similarly,
where the Board dismisses a petition on jurisdictional grounds, the court will either
have to decide itself who is the proper bargaining agent or refer the matter to a state
labor relations board.
35. See, e.g., Elsner v. General Motors Corp., 25 LAD. REL. REP. (Ref. Man.) 2514
(Ohio C.P. 1950) (injunction to preserve the status quo; employer ordered to deal
with committeemen elected before schism until NLRB determination).
It might be advisable for the Board to give priority to cases referred to it by the
courts. In that way, the necessity for a Board determination would not unduly delay
a court decision.
36. For a discussion of the theories on which courts settle rival claims to union
property, see Notes, 58 YALE L.J. 1171 (1949) ; 63 HARY. L. REv. 1413, 1414-20 (1950).
See also Huntsman v. McGovern, 91 N.E. 2d 717 (Ohio C.P. 1949), where, following
the UE-CIO schism, the court ordered that funds from dues, collections and other
assets be impounded until the issuance of an NLRB decision.
37. It is also governed by § 9(c) (3) of the Taft-Hartley Act, which provides that
no election shall be directed in any bargaining unit within which, in the preceding
twelve-month period, a valid election has been held. 61 STAT. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(c) (3) (Supp. 1950). For the Board's policy as to unions which have not com-
plied with the Act's filing and affidavit requirements, see note 35 supra.
38. Reasonable duration currently means two years, International Paper Co., 80
N.L.R.B. 751 (1948), unless contracts for longer terms are customary in the industry.
California Walnut Growers Assn., 77 N.L.R.B. 756 (1948). If the contract is for an
unreasonably long or indefinite term, it will be protected only during its initial two
years. Rheinstein Construction Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 46 (1950); Association of Motion
Picture Producers, Inc., 88 N.L.R.B. 521 (1950).
39. E.g., Elwood Machine & Tool Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 1618 (1945) (over 80%o of
employees expressed desire to change bargaining representatives by voting at a meeting,
petition, and authorization cards); Montgomery Ward & Co., 68 N.L.R.B. 369 (1946)
(testimony that contracting union's membership had fallen to about 5% of the employees
in the unit); Telex, Inc., 90 N.L.R.B. 43 (1950) (election denied because there was
no formal collective action to disaffiliate).
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however, when the contracting union is defunct.40 In addition, an election will
usually be held when a formal mass disaffiliation or schism results in "doubt
as to the identity" of the representative4' or "breakdown in the normal bar-
gaining relationship." 42
Whenever the Board invokes one of these exceptions and displaces a con-
tracting union, courts should regard that union as stripped of all prospective
rights and obligations under the agreement.43 This will automatically give
full effect to the latest official expression of majority preference by the em-
ployees. It will also ensure that an employer will no longer be faced with
conflicting obligations to honor a contract with one union and bargain col-
lectively with another.
Similarly, upon being replaced, an employer's liability under the contract
normally should cease. However, a retiring employer should remain re-
sponsible for breaches which he has caused or aggravated.44 And the employer
should also continue to be liable for that portion of accruing obligations, like
severance and vacation pay, which have accrued during the time he was party
to the agreement.45
If one of the contracting parties is replaced, the object of the law should be
to promote stability by preventing the usual hiatus in contractual relations.
An existing agreement should continue in effect until its termination date
under the administration of the new employer or the newly certified bargain-
ing agent, unless the parties revise it by mutual consent.46 Most provisions of
the contract should be as applicable to the new relationship as to the old, re-
quiring only' a change of names and titles. Even a union shop provision in
the agreement should present no special difficulty. The Taft-Hartley Act
40. E.g., Rock City Paper Box Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 746 (1949).
41. E.g., Rubber Corp. of America, 88 N.L.R.B. 922, 923 (1950); Liquid Carbonic
Corp., 85 N.L.R.B. 284 (1949).
42. E.g., Boston Machine Works, 89 N.L.R.B. No. 17 (1950); Bowen Products
Corp., 89 N.L.R.B. No. 20 (1950). But cf. Telex, Inc., 90 N.L.R.B. No. 43 (1950) (no
election). But even then, an election may be denied if the change of affiliation is induced
by an active raiding campaign by a rival. Owen-Illinois Pacific Coast Co., 36 N.L.R.B.
990 (1941).
43. Of course, the displaced union should still be capable of suing and being sued
upon causes of action that arose under the contract prior to the termination of its
bargaining agency.
44. See notes 25 and 26 supra. The replaced employer should also have a cause of
action for damages for breaches occurring before the change.
45. See, e.g., In re Brooklyn Citizen, 23 LAB. REL. REP. (Ref. Man.) 2429 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1949) (dissolution); Empire Case Goods Workers Union v. Empire Case
Goods Co., 271 App. Div. 149, 63 N.Y.S.2d 35 (4th Dep't 1946) (sale of business).
46. The War Labor Board required a successor to assume a contract when its
relationship to the predecessor was a close one, as in reorganization and merger. Snow
Lumber Co., 24 VAR LAB. REP. 306 (1945) (partnership formed by ex-stockholders
of contracting corporation); Geilich Tanning Co., 20 WAR LAB. REP. 353 (RWLB 1,
1947) (successor union); National Munitions Co., 14 WAR LAn. REP. 644 (RWLB 3,
1944) (same officers, product, employees, ownership).
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permits an employer and a union to agree to a union shop, provided the union
is authorized to make such an agreement by a majority vote of the eligible
employees.4 7 This vote should be construed as a continuing authorization to
whatever labor organization is the duly certified representative of the em-
ployees concerned, until the employees rescind the authorization. Thus if one
union replaces another as the certified representative and the employees do
not take affirmative action under § 9(e) (2)48 to reject a previously authorized
union shop, the union shop provisions in the existing agreement should operate
automatically in favor of the new union.49
Of course a change in one of the parties to a collective agreement may be ac-
companied by other changes which render parts of the agreement obsolete or
inadequate. For example, a shift in employers may result in changes in the
business or operations and in the creation of new jobs. But changes of this
sort can occur just as readily without any shift in parties. And in this area
it may be undesirable, perhaps almost impossible, to prescribe a complete set
of rules in advance for the problems which may arise. Each situation is an
extraordinary and pathological case; each is enmeshed in unique circum-
stances pulling in a variety of directions. Usually at least some of the problems
must be solved before authoritative determination from a governmental
agency can be had; the business and the employment cannot be suspended for
the months or years which a proceeding for such a determination requires.
Uusually, therefore, the parties involved manage-despite the strains and
difficulties and sometimes with the aid of ad hoc interlocutory orders-to reach
amicable adjustment at least on the matters controlling future operations.50
47. Amended NLRA §§8(a)(3) and 9(e), 61 STAT. 140, 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 158(a) (3), 159(e) (Supp. 1950). These provisions also apply to maintenance of
membership agreements. General Electric Corp., 81 N.L.R.B. 476 (1949).
48. Section 9(e) (2) of the Taft-Hartley Act provides that if 30% or more of the
employees in a bargaining unit covered by a union shop agreement file a petition
alleging their desire that the union shop authorization be rescinded, the Board is to
take a secret ballot of such employees. 61 STAT. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(e) (2)
(Supp. 1950). Section 9(e) (3), however, further provides that "[n]o election shall
be conducted pursuant to this subsection [9(e)] in any bargaining unit or any sub-
division within which, in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election shall
have been held." 61 STAT. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(e) (3) (Supp. 1950).
49. In similar fashion, any check-off provisions in the agreement should be auto-
matically carried over to the successor union. This could be accomplished by regarding
the employee's written assignment under LMRA § 302(c) (4), 61 STAT. 157 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 186(c) (4) (Supp. 1950), as an assignment in favor of whatever union is
the duly certified representative.
50. In many cases, the contract itself will provide for reopening certain provisions
when circumstances change. And grievance machinery or arbitration procedures in the
agreement may afford an avenue for alteration or reinterpretation of existing clauses
to fit current needs. The extent to which these procedures may be used to alter the
contract varies widely, depending on the provisions of the contract. Compare Northland
Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Amalgamated Assn., 66 F. Supp. 431 (D.C. Minn. 1946),
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The function of the law can be only to announce quite general principles by
way of encouragement rather than command. And it is submitted that the
preferable principles would be that (a) as a general rule a change of party of
the kind discussed is not a method for terminating or avoiding a collective
agreement; (b) such a change made for other reasons may, however, neces-
sarily affect the collective agreement involved; (c) the new parties should be
under a duty, and normally would desire, to negotiate on these effects; (d)
but these negotiations should and can be carried out on the premise that the
existing agreement is to continue to the extent that it can be applied-that is,
with regard to the circumstances which have not been changed by the change
of party-and that amendments are required to the extent that the change of
party has created new or changed conditions requiring joint treatment.51
and Southern Colorado Power Co., 28 WAR LAB. REP. 157 (1945), with In re American
Dietaids Co., 21 LAB. RE.. REP. (Ref. Man.) 2508 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948).
51. Section 8(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 STAT. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(Supp. 1950), should not be construed as relieving the union or employer from a duty
to bargain in good faith about changes in the existing contract necessitated by a shift
in parties. Nor should it prevent the union or employer from resorting to strike or
lock-out in the event those negotiations break down.
Section 8(d) provides in part that the duty to bargain collectively means that "no
party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the party desiring
such termination or modification-
(1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the proposed
termination or modification sixty days prior to the expiration date thereof ...
... and
(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out,
all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days
after such notice is given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever
occurs later . . . ." [Italics added]
The section goes on to specify, however, that the fourth requirement (as well as the
second and third, omitted from the passage quoted above) "shall become inapplicable
upon an intervening certification" of the NLRB, under which the union that is a party
to the contract "has been superseded as or ceased to be" the representative of the
employees concerned. Thus when one union has displaced another as the certified rep-
resentative, neither the new union nor the employer need comply with 8(d) (4). Further-
more, the NLRB has refused to interpret 8(d) (4) literally. Rather the Board has
construed it merely as "prohibit[ing] a strike to secure modification or termination of
a collective agreement for a period which is limited to 60 days after a proper notice
of the proposed modification or termination has been given." United Packinghouse
Workers of America (CIO), 25 LAB. Rn.. REP. (Labor-Management) 1556, 1560 (1950).
The Board felt that a literal interpretation of the section would thwart Congressional
intent, for "[n]owhere in the legislative history is there any indication of an intent to
extend the statutory waiting period beyond the 60 days to which reference is repeatedly
made." Id. at 1559. Thus where a union or employer feels that a shift in parties has
necessitated changes in the existing contract, and wishes to press its position by resorting
to strike or lock-out, the most that is required under the Board's interpretation of
8(d) (4) is that the strike or lock-out be deferred until 60 days after the giving of
notice under 8(d)(1).
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